Moreover, in an integrated EU market it should not matter where a country receives its energy from, as it should be able to count on supply from its partners.

Russia tries to sell its oil and gas at world market prices: contrary to popular conception, Russian energy is not much cheaper than imports from elsewhere. Some Member State objections to stricter energy sanctions, on display at the recent special meeting of the European Council, are more political than economic.

In any event, identifying shared threats and reacting decisively in a crisis are not the same as fostering a common understanding of European interests or developing an EU grand strategy. The unprecedented level of sanctions adopted are certainly notable, although this cohesion has already begun to fray. The days when a plethora of European voices emphasised understanding and strategic empathy towards Russia’s declared security concerns are unlikely to return for the foreseeable future. Putin’s war has undoubtedly consolidated EU elite opinion along anti-Russia lines. It neglects a third and perhaps equally consequential dynamic, namely the (at least temporary) increased influence of the EU’s eastern members. Contrasting with its exclusion from the diplomatic high table prior to the war, the exercise of Russian aggression has allegedly strengthened the EU in two fashions: enhancing unity between its Member States and prompting capitals to take matters of security and defence more seriously.

Strategic war in europe